Abstract: Advanced industrial countries have been exhibiting a steady decline of the labor income shares in the last two decades. We explain this phenomenon by resorting to the old Stolper-Samuelson theorem. The conclusions concerning the impact of free trade on the income distribution are unambiguous in a Heckscher-Ohlin world with two countries, two goods and two factors of production (capital and labor). In contrast, the consequences of FDI from the capital abundant country (EU) to the labor abundant CEEC are ambiguous. Both scenarios are investigated theoretically and then simulated with a hypothetical two country CGE model, including the EU and the CEEC. A panel regression for both regions separately, helps to decide empirically which influences on the development of the labor income shares are at work. Globalization, measured by revealed comparative advantage (increase in global net trade) has contributed to a decline in the labor income shares in the EU. Additionally, those countries which are engaged more in trade with the CEEC can expect a sharper decline in the wage share. Global net FDI outflow also exerts a negative influence on the labor income share in the EU. In the CEEC the increase in global net trade had a positive influence on the labor income share, trade with the EU, however, dampened the labor income share. FDI inflow increased the labor income share in the CEEC.
We focus on one stylized fact of this overall picture of globalization, namely the continued decline in the labor income shares in the European countries over the past two decades. In contrast to the IMF study, we concentrate more on trade and FDI and not on labor migration. The reason is that labor migration within the enlarged EU is handicapped by transitional arrangements. After outlining some stylized facts on the income distribution in Western and Eastern European countries, we start with theoretical explanations for these phenomena by resorting to the traditional Heckscher-Ohlin framework and in particular to the StolperSamuelson theorem. Within this theoretical context we also make simulations with a two-country CGE model, considering the EU as a capital abundant country and the Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC) as the labor abundant country. We simulate the consequences of free trade on the income distribution as well as those of FDI from the EU in the CEEC. As even the simple theoretical H-O framework not always results in unambiguous conclusions, we test our hypotheses with a panel-econometric approach.
Stylized facts of income distribution
In the last two decades the advanced economies experienced a steady decline in the labor income shares (see the documentation in IMF (2007A) and OECD (2007)). However, there are differences. The decline in the labor income shares have been more pronounced in some Western European countries (Austria, Germany, Finland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden) with a decline from 1970 to 2006 by 3 to 11 percentage points, with EU-15 at 3.2 and the USA at 4.5 percentage points (see Figure 1a) . The other advanced countries (see Figure 1b ) exhibited declines smaller than 3 percentage points; some countries even increased their wage shares (e.g. Belgium, Japan, Portugal and Luxembourg).
In Eastern Europe or the new EU member states, there are available only shorter time series to measure the functional income distribution. Even in the CEEC -contrary to the expectation for a region which is primarily labor abundant -the labor income shares did not increase, but in many occasions we also find a similar picture as that in the advanced economies (see Figure 2 ).
Between 1995 and 2006, the largest decline exhibited Latvia (-12 ½ percentage points, followed by Slovenia (-9.2 pp), Bulgaria (-8.4 pp), Poland (-7.8 pp) and Estonia (-7.3 pp). In the other countries there were only minimal declines or some increases (e.g. Cyprus, Lithuania and Malta). In order to explain the phenomenon of declining labor income shares -primarily in the advanced economies -we refer to the Stolper-Samuelson theorem (Stolper and Samuelson, 1941) , henceforth abbreviated with S-S. This paper was the first to demonstrate the Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) theorem in a two goods, two countries, two factors (capital and labor) model. The H-O theorem shows that with identical technologies at home and abroad, the country with the larger endowment of capital relative to labor should export the capital intensive good. By the same reasoning, the country with the larger endowment of labor relative to capital should export the labor intensive good. Although we know from the many attempts to test the H-O theory, demonstrating that the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem holds empirically has proven a lot trickier than anyone expected, but the bottom line is that it is extremely helpful for thinking about trade between countries with widely different capital labor ratios. The major result of the S-S theorem was to confirm the intuitive analysis of Ohlin about who wins and who loses when a country opens up to trade. The answer is that the relatively abundant factor gains and the relatively scarce factor lose, not only in nominal terms but also in real terms. Thus if capital is the relatively abundant factor (compared to the trading partner), then the liberalization of trade will result in an increase in the return on capital more than proportionately compared to the price of either good, whereas the wage rate will fall relative to the price of either good. Admittedly, many of the simple 2x2x2 results do not generalize so easily where there are more factors and more goods but they do typically go through in a weaker sense, and the broad intuition remains critical in helping us understand how trade affects welfare.
We study the S-S effects of European's mini globalization in two steps, namely the income distributional effects of trade liberalization and those of factor movements. (ii) Second we study the possible consequences of the ongoing process of direct investments from the old to the new EU member states.
Whereas the distributional effects of the trade liberalization are a clear-cut result of the S-S theorem, the implications of FDIs are not so simple.
In order to demonstrate the S-S theorem we start with the following assumptions. There are two regions -EU15 (EU) and 12 new EU member states (CEEC). The EU is capital abundant, the CEEC is labor abundant. Two goods are produced in both countries -good 1 (cars, produced capital intensively), good 2 (textiles, produced labor intensively). The EU as the capital abundant country has a comparative advantage in the production (and export) of the capital intensive good 1(cars = C); the CEEC as the labor abundant country has a comparative advantage in the production (and export) of the labor intensive good 2 (textiles = T). The assumptions concerning the different factor abundance in the EU and CEE are not only fictitious, but real. Although there are no reliable and comparable data on the capital stocks in CEEC, the relative labor abundance in CEEC is manifested in the low wage levels relative to those in the EU, a relationship sometimes in the order of 1:10 (see Eurostat, 2007, p. 180 ).
Zero profit conditions in each industry imply the following price equations,
where C P and T P are the prices of cars and textiles respectively, w is the wage rate paid on labor and r is the rental rate on capital. ij a are the unit input coefficients, denoting the amount of factor i (capital, K and labor, L ) required for unit output of good j (cars, C and textiles, T ).
< Figure 3 about here >
From the price equations (1) and (2) one can derive the wage-rental combinations for both industries (see Figure 3 ). We assume unchanged input coefficients ij a . Then, a move from autarky (tariff-ridden scenario) to free trade raises the (relative) price of the capital intensive good (C, cars). The price increase causes an outward parallel shift in the thick zero-profit line for cars as shown in Figure   1 . The equilibrium point will shift from E to F causing an increase in the equilibrium rental rate from 1 r to 2 r , and a decrease in the equilibrium wage rate from 1 w to 2 w .
This gives the Stolper-Samuelson theorem: An increase in the price of a good will cause an increase in the price of the factor used intensively in that industry and a decrease in the price of the other factor.
For the mathematical derivation we proceed as follows: When C P alone changes, we have by
and by differentiating equation (2)
Putting both together, we have
Assuming that at the initial equilibrium, good C is relatively more capital intensive, i.e.
and
These results are the mathematical statement of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem.
As Dixit-Norman (1980, p 54) point out, an even stronger conclusion is possible using the elasticity of r with respect to C P . By Euler's Theorem from equation (1) we have r a P KC C > , and using (6), we get for the capital intensive good in the capital abundant country EU
As a mirror image one can derive the equivalent elasticity result for the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem in the case of a change of T P for the labor abundant country CEEC. As assumed the CEEC has a comparative advantage in the labor intensive good. The elasticity of w with respect to the price of good T, T P is higher than one. 
International equilibrium is characterized by a national income identity for each country (equations (9) and (10)), and market-clearing equations for the goods for the two countries taken together, in equation (11). The equation (9) and (10) equate expenditures -e ( E ) -on the left hand side with incomes -r ( R ) plus/minus income from investing in CEEC -on the right hand side, in both countries. Equation (11) clears all goods market, in home and abroad, by equating the demand for goods p e ( P E ) with their supplies -p r ( P R ).
Consider a slight change ξ d in ξ . Taking total differentials, dW Wd dv r dp r du e dp e v p u p 
This gives the solution in matrix format: There is an element of coincidence of private and social desirability at the world level: adding (15) and (16) we have
Therefore if direct investment is privately desirable, both countries cannot simultaneously lose by it, and it is possible that they both gain. Once again we see from (16) that the foreign country gains if and only if the terms of trade shift in its favor, i.e. against the home country.
Equation (18) 
while for the foreign country to benefit we need
The interpretation is not simple. We did a numerical calculation for reasonable parameter settings and get the following results for one special case with the following parameterization:
; the elasticity of the wage rate differential with respect to prices is 0.5. It follows that the condition for home (C home) to benefit from FDI outflows is -0.25 and that for abroad (C abroad) to benefit from FDI inflow is 0. benefit from the factor movements of capital from home (EU) to foreign (CEEC), given that the earnings of this direct investment are repatriated to the investing country (EU). However, each other parameterization could lead to other outcomes.
Because of this theoretical ambiguity we first make simulations with a two country computable general equilibrium (CGE) model with fictitious parameterization and then we test the theoretical predictions with a panel econometric approach.
Free trade, FDI and income distribution in a two-country CGE model
In order to quantify the effects of free trade and FDI on income distribution we apply a fictitious symmetric two country, two factors of production and two goods computable general equilibrium ). The differential in the capital rental rates inspires EU firms to invest directly in the CEEC. We do not only look at the factor prices but on the consequences for the labor income shares in particular. The labor income (or wage) share is calculated as the wage sum (wage rate multiplied by the number of workers) relative to GNI (including factor income from FDI from abroad), which is the most common indicator of functional income distribution.
We consider on the one hand the change from a tariff-ridden situation to free trade. On the other hand we consider FDI flows out of the EU to the CEEC because of the differential in capital rents. FDI outflows from the CEEC are -for the time being -negligible and, hence are not considered here. We assume that 25 units of capital are invested by EU firms in the CEEC.
This reduces the capital stock in EU down to 125 and increases capital in CEEC up to 125. As in the theoretical specification in the previous chapters, we assume that the income of the capital invested in the CEEC is repatriated to the EU.
Overall, we consider four scenarios. The results are collected in Table 1 and can be summarized as follows:
S1) Baseline is the tariff-ridden economies in EU and
1) The free trade scenario yields the Stolper-Samuelson (S-S) results: Comparing the free trade scenario (S3) with the tariff-ridden scenario (S1), in the capital abundant EU nominal and real rental prices increase. The labor income share goes down by 5.8 percentage points, utility increases. In the labor abundant CEEC we also get the Stolper-Samuelson effects: nominal and real wage rates increase and utility improves; the labor income share goes up by 5.8 percentage points. Overall, in this symmetric two-country world the change from protectionism to free trade leads to total factor price equalization. Wage rates decrease (increase) in the EU (CEEC) to 0.543. Rental rates of capital increase (decrease) in the EU (CEEC) to 0.543, respectively. The assumed symmetry of the CGE model is reflected in the mirror-inverted results concerning the changes of factor prices and utility.
2) The FDI scenarios are -as expected theoretically -not so clear-cut, as far as the S-S effects are concerned and also concerning the performance of utility.
2a) Comparing the tariff-ridden plus FDI scenario (S2) with the tariff-ridden scenario (S1) we get as a net result the FDI effects in a tariff ridden environment. In this scenario one receives clear S-S effects in the EU, but not in the CEECs. In the EU, nominal and real rental rates of capital increase (S-S effect), but the labor income share and also utility decline considerably. In the CEEC, surprisingly nominal and real wages decline and also the labor income share goes down.
However, utility improves.
2b) Comparing the free trade plus FDI scenario (S4) with the tariff-ridden plus FDI scenario (S2),
in the EU we get the theoretically plausible S-S effects and a decline of the labor income share by 5.5 percentage points and a deterioration of utility. In the CEEC we also get the S-S effects in factor prices, an increase in the labor income share and an improvement in utility.
2c) Comparing the scenarios (S4) with (S3) we get as a net result the FDI effects under free trade.
In the EU, again we get the S-S effects on factor prices as well as the expected decline in the labor income share; also utility declines considerably. In the CEEC, the S-S effects are implausibly negative and also the labor income share declines. However, utility improves strongly.
< Table 1 about here >
Econometric evidence on the implications of free trade and FDI on income distribution
The theory -at least in the framework of Heckscher-Ohlin -is unambiguous concerning the effects of free trade on factor prices. The resulting labor income share is usually the consequence of a complicated general equilibrium process. In countries which have comparative advantages in capital intensive goods (in our case we subsume the whole block of the EU countries to be relatively capital abundant) under free trade their rental price of capital will increase. That means that the labor income share in GNI declines. In countries with comparative advantages in labor intensive goods (in our case we assume that the country block of the CEEC is relatively labor abundant) when opening up to free trade their wages will increase. Usually, this implies that also the labor income share in GNI increases. These factor changes in relation to price changes are the classical Stolper-Samuelson effect described above. Whereas the S-S results are clear-cut in the case of free trade, the effect of direct investment on the income distribution is not so clear. So we try to decide empirically which forces are working behind in determining the labor income share in the EU and in the CEEC, respectively.
We know that the Heckscher-Ohlin world is nicer in theory than in praxis. Therefore we test the theoretically derived predictions. Accordingly, the capital abundant EU should have suffered a decline in the labor income share (as a result of the S-S effect), whereas the labor abundant We estimate the following equations:
For the EU:
For the CEEC: Therefore we also capture the trade involvement with the CEEC as an extra variable.
< Table 2 about here >
1) The results for the EU:
The labor income share decreases -as expected -as a consequence of globalization in general (see Table 2 , first column). 2) The results for the CEEC: Here we expect that the labor income share is influenced positively by overall net trade and also positively by trade with the EU. From Table 2 (second column) we see that the former is confirmed, whereas the latter is not. Trade with the EU leads to a decline of the labor income share in the CEEC. We saw that the theory is ambiguous as far as the effects of income distribution of the FDI inflow into CEEC are concerned. Here, FDI inflow has a (weak) positive impact on the labor income share in the CEEC.
Digression: When testing the short-term changes of the labor income share, depending on business cycle indicators, like annual GDP growth and the change in the unemployment rate, we get the following results for our two country blocs EU and CEEE (see Table 3 ). In our panel for the EU we get similar results as Marterbauer and Walterskirchen (2003) received for a single times series analysis for Austria. However, one should admit that the variables GDP growth and unemployment rate are linked via Okun's law, and therefore one should expect multicollinearity when regressing changes in the labor income shares on both variables together. Nevertheless, both variables have a negative influence on the change in the labor income share (see Table 3 , Whereas these relations hold quite well in the advanced economies of the West (EU), in the case of the transformation economies of the CEEC all relevant variables are insignificant (see Table 3 , second column). This is not easy to interpret: on the one hand, the time period is shorter as in the case of the EU. On the other hand wage bargaining may be less influenced by trade unions, which are probably not yet as strong as in the old EU member states. Rather then the wage level seems to be set by foreign investors more according to their international performance and less so depending on the general business cycle considerations in a specific CEEC.
< Table 3 Scenarios: S1 =baseline is the tariff-ridden economies in EU and CEEC; S2 = tariff-ridden plus FDI from EU to CEEC; S3 = free trade (without FDI); S4 = free trade plus FDI from EU to CEEC. 1) Deflated in both countries with its export prices (where they have comparative advantages). 
